Yesterday President Bush and Secretary Gates both made comments in support of the missile defense system to be installed in Eastern Europe. This system has raised the ire of the Russians and has been controversial with the domestic populace in Poland and the Czech Republic, where the key components of the system will be deployed.

I am wondering if, by the time missile defense systems are successful, the ballistic missile threat won’t be completely obsolete in the minds of all of our potential adversaries. While ballistic missiles, particularly those with intercontinental range, require mastery over several extremely difficult technical challenges, they also suffer from some immense limitations. For those unfamiliar with the nature of a ballistic missile, it is one that is directed during its initial boost phase. In other words, it is like throwing a rock. Once it leaves your hand, it is up to momentum and gravity to carry it through its arched trajectory to the target. This can be contrasted to a cruise missile which can make constant course corrections and can (and does) fly low to the earth (but has a much more limited range.) The missile defenses in question generally address the ballistic missile threat and not that of cruise missiles. The advantage of a ballistic missile is of course the capacity for covering huge distances relatively rapidly. However, the downside is that the point of origin is known with a high degree of precision. There is no such thing as an anonymous ballistic missile attack. For this reason, a state conducting an attack by means of ballistic missiles has to be ready to suffer massive retaliation, and the complete lack of ambiguity about the source of the attacks would likely throw global public opinion against the country initiating the attack.

One doesn’t have to be as critical as MIT’s Ted Postal to realize that there are some technical challenges for missile defense that have not yet been overcome. Tests in late 2004 and 2005 failed dismally, and the entire history of missile defense testing does not inspire courage. This is not to say that intelligent people aren’t working hard to achieve a successful system, but the challenge of hitting a warhead in the downward portion of its path when it is moving extremely quickly – and has long since dropped its booster and thus become a relatively small target - is daunting. Hitting the missile in its boost phase is much easier, but, of course, requires having the interceptors deployed close to the launch site constantly, which is expensive and difficult to maintain.

I do not mean to imply that any technology has to be completely perfected before deployment. If ballistic missiles were the predominant threat facing us today, I would scoff at the notion that a system should have to be able to knock out 25 of 25 missiles with 25 interceptors, or anything close to that level of performance. What I do wish to say is that we should be certain that the scarce resources we put into securing the nation give us the most bang for the buck (or in this case, the least [enemy] bang for the buck), and I’m not convinced that missile defenses do this. For one thing, the downside in terms of alienating Russia is not trivial, and should be given due consideration. Furthermore, if we ask whether the billions spent on missile defense could buy more security given the threat environment we face today and are likely to face in the foreseeable future, I think it could indeed.

It is true that both North Korea and Iran are putting a lot of effort into building longer range missiles. While both countries are struggling with the task and it may be quite some time before they achieve ranges that would threaten the US or NATO countries, it may be longer before we develop the capacity to reliably neutralize them. However, it is far from clear that deterrence does not effectively neutralize them. As indicated above, a first strike would result in such a devastating retort that it is hard to imagine North Korea or Iran initiating an attack via this means. Another question would be what kind of warhead either of these countries would deploy. While North Korea may have a few nuclear devices, it is hard to imagine that they have succeeded with the miniaturization tasks required to deploy nuclear weapons - even if they had a missile that could reach the US. Chemical and biological agents also present challenges for missile delivery, and may be quite fickle in their effects once delivered. Iran and North Korea may be developing ballistic missiles for just the purpose they state, to have a deterrent capability. I know it is difficult to take both President Ahmedinejad and Kim Jong Il seriously because Kim has a penchant for deceit and Ahmedinejad is constantly making all manner of crazy statements. However, if one looks past their statements to their interests, it is much less difficult to believe that deterrence is their intention. Let us not forget the crazy bastards that ran the Soviet Union. Stalin was not exactly the model of civility, and Khrushchev took his shoe off and pounded it on a podium at the UN shouting “we will bury you” (come on, if that ain’t wacky behavior, I don’t know what is.) But they never dared use the missiles they had, and I don’t think the current menace is likely to either. This is not to imply that I don’t worry about North Korea or Iran attempting to deliver a destructive blow with weapons of mass destruction. However, I think Kim Jong Il thinks he could outsmart the world, and would behave in a manner accordingly (not one in which his guilt was indisputable); and Iran seems more likely to use a terrorist group surrogate and a means commensurate with such an organization’s capacities.  

The Bush Administration has asserted that there is no contradiction between defense and deterrence, but this flies in the face of what many of us learned reading Schelling and other architects of deterrence strategy. This does not mean the Administration is  not correct, but I have not heard them elucidate their logic in a convincing way. In fact, all I have heard is a bald-faced assertion that remained completely unsupported as if it should be taken as the gospel because it poured forth from graced lips. Even if the system will in fact be limited such as to not negate the deterrence value of the Russian’s arsenal, why should missile defense programs not push the Chinese to move away from their relatively small arsenal?