Iran has apparently reached the milestone that it had hoped to have in effect by the end of last year. That is, it has a 3,000 centrifuge cascade operating at its plant at Natanz. According to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the plant is operating at some undisclosed fractional capacity. Such a small scale operation operating at partial capacity could take years to produce enough highly enriched uranium (HEU) for a weapons program, but, of course, it is expected that Iran will continue to expand its capabilities.
On the other hand, as long as Iran is under safeguards, they cannot move into HEU production for long without sounding alarms. While the IAEA does not have the monitoring capacity in place that it wishes it had, there are surveillance technologies in place as well as periodic inspections being conducted. The August report stated that samples had only discovered uranium contamination on machines of 3.7% U-235 (See: Iran’s Enrichment Program, 10/5/07), with the Iranians claiming they had gotten to 4.8%, but that once tailings were studied the IAEA would have a better idea of the level of enrichment achieved to that point. (Either of these values is well below what would be needed for even a crude bomb.) The IAEA and the Security Council would like Iran to return to voluntary compliance with the Additional Protocols, which Iran has not ratified, but at one point had agreed to comply with on a voluntary basis. This would allow even greater information to be collected.
While the November 15, 2007 IAEA report on Iran has not been released for public dissemination, there has been hints that Iran has begun to supply some of the information that they have been withholding for the past few years (albeit past deadline.) In particular, the Iranians have given a description of how they came to be in possession of centrifuge technologies. However, there seems to be some concern that it is not a complete and accurate explanation. The issue of how the Iranians developed centrifuge production capacity is one of several outstanding issues that have resulted in UN Security Council decisions against Iran. However, there are others such as failure to explan HEU contamination on equipment in Iran’s possession. (These two issues are key to further unlocking some of the riddles remaining regarding the A.Q. Khan Proliferation ring.) The most damning evidence potentially is yet unsubstantiated indications of a Project Green Salt that involved alleged research by Iran into weaponization technologies.
It should be noted that, while Iran has been in violation of its safeguard commitments for failure to report facilities and provide other information, this is alone not sufficient to conclude that Iran is seeking to produce nuclear weapons. It is essentially circumstantial evidence, albeit, in some cases, compelling circumstantial evidence. For example, it doesn’t make much economic sense for Iran to build a capacity to produce nuclear power plant fuel at several times the cost it would pay Russia for that fuel.
The Project Green Light evidence supposedly provides an indication that Iran has been conducting experiments with high explosives and warhead design that are more definitive indications of a weapons program. Nuclear weapons require quite sophisticated explosives formed into lens that will explode at differential rates to turn a convex shock wave concave for the purposes of compressing a sphere of fissile material. Additionally, it is a very complex engineering task to produce a warhead that can be delivered by a ballistic missile (e.g. it must be small enough and light enough.)
If this information were verified and in the public domain, the pressure on Iran from the global community and key members like Russia and China would likely be much greater. However, it turns out this information was obtained off a laptop that some element of the US intelligence community absconded with from Iran, and the information has apparently been kept in a close hold. Portions of the information were apparently provided to the IAEA, but dissemination has been largely restricted. If it is true that said laptop was obtained, and it does provide evidence of this Project Green Salt, it is an indication of great work by the US intelligence community, which has suffered many a black-eye (not always rightfully) in recent years.
However, it is intelligence’s damned luck that they made such a coup during the time period they have. One of the many tragedies of events in Iraq is that the US is now in the position of being the “boy who cried wolf”on weapons of mass destruction (WMD.) It is generally recognized that governments need to keep some information secret to protect intelligence sources and methods, and in most cases the US citizenry, if not the global public, would be willing to give the US government some of the benefit of the doubt in this regard. However, after post-invasion inspections of Iraq turned up no substantial WMD presence, both the US citizenry and the rest of the world are exceedingly unwilling to take America’s word for anything that might lead to further military action. At any rate, Iran completely denies it is working on such things, and, as outrageous as Ahmedinejad may be, US credibility, disturbingly, is not exactly vastly above Iran’s at this point in time.
4 Comments
November 16, 2007 at 5:53 pm
Actually it makes perfect sense for the Iranians to want to make their own nuclear fuel, considering that even Cheney accused the Russians of practicing energy blackmail.
Would the US be willing to make its entire nuclear power industry reliant on foreign imports of fuel? Why should Iran?
I also recommend the analysis of the IAEA Iran report at IranAffairs.com
November 16, 2007 at 6:41 pm
Of course, this diversity of supply and supply disruption mitigation argument is a potent one for the Iranians. One doesn’t need to think the Russians would engage in blackmail to employ the argument. One need only point to all the potential instabilities facing Russia from demographic crises to political unrest to express concern about it as your only “friendly” supplier.
However, I am not entirely convinced that this argument is good for more than rhetoric because Iran will ultimately be at the mercy of suppliers from other nations for nuclear fuel at some level no matter what. Iran (as of current knowledge) has only limited supplies of low grade uranium ore. The more it isolates itself with its behavior, the more difficult it will be to get shipments of even natural uranium. As it faces not the world market, but a limited set of potential suppliers, it may face exorbitant prices. (Not unlike drug users have to pay a high premium to the few individuals willing to engage in hazardous act of dealing drugs.)
The analogy to the US is apt in that no matter how we try to diversify petroleum supplies, we can’t get away from unfriendly (re: Venezuela) or unstable (re: Nigeria) suppliers, just as Iran will have great expense getting nuclear fuel without dealing with countries to which it does not have the most cordial of relations. I understand North Korea has considerable supplies of uranium ore of a better grade than the Iranian’s, but this is, of course, not exactly a dependable supplier (either because of its own woes or because the embargoes it might face.)
If Iran really wants a diversified energy supply, it should either pursue a route other than nuclear or avoid being an international paraiah.
November 17, 2007 at 12:48 am
For a site called Strategic Thinking your question as why Iran wouldn’t want to make itself dependent on Russia — a geographically proximate, and politically volatile, ex-super power neighbor that might want to curry US favor — for its supply of nuclear fuel is remarkably naive.
November 19, 2007 at 1:35 pm
I understand that there are a number of problems that might arise from relying on Russia as a supplier, and diversification of finished fuel is not really much of an option because there are so few exporters of enriched fuel. The point is, if it is about the energy, why pursue nuclear and pay several times what the going rate for nuclear generated electricity is? There seems to be some recognition of this in Iran because they did contract with Russia to provide all the fuel they would need for the Bushehr plant, should it ever come on line. Yet whether the indigenous conversion and enrichment capability is an insurance policy or the Iranians plan to shift over to fuel which consists of imported natural uranium that is made into finished fuel domestically (I suspect the former would be the more economically sound path), it translates into a substantial premium they will be paying per kilowatt hour for their electricity generated by nuclear. Iran’s economy has not been doing so stellar that they have money to burn, and I have trouble believing their willingness to pay that premium is out of a concern for the planet and a desire to reduce global warming.
Bush Administration figures have made a statement that, at first, doesn’t seem to make any economic sense. That is [paraphrasing]: ‘If Iran is sitting on a mountain of oil, why does it need to generate nuclear power?’ Of course, with petroleum products being such high value export commodities, it might make sense for an exporting nation to shift its own consumption away from oil to gain more return from the high price of exported petroleum. However, given the excess amount Iran will pay for nuclear under its current fuel acquisition strategy (if the Bushehr plant comes on line), it’s unclear that that they would make any gains by shifting toward nuclear generation to reduce fossil fuel usage.