December 13, 2007...2:18 pm
Budapest Missile Defense Talks
Talks are being held today in Budapest, Hungary between Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Kislyak and Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Rood about plans for a missile defense system that is intended to shield Europe. Russia has opposed plans to build such a system because it is seen as a means to reduce the effectiveness of the Russian deterrent threat. The US, on the other hand, has stated that the system is designed to defeat ballistic missile threats originating in the Middle East (most explicitly Iran), and that the ten interceptors would not affect the strategic calculus. The proposed system would include radar installations in the Czech Republic and an interceptor site in Poland because that arrangement is believed to offer the broadest possible protection possible given the type of missile defense system being employed (i.e. mid-course intercept.)
However, things took an interesting turn when President Putin suggested a counter proposal that would include a radar facility in Azerbaijan and a joint approach that would include Russia in the partnership. The US response has tended toward being positive on the Putin proposal as an ancillary measure to the original plans, but not as a means to supersede the old plans. This may not be acceptable to the Russians as it essentially leaves the system that they railed against intact, in exchange for throwing them a bone.
The question of where the facilities should be located to have optimal effectiveness is a technical issue that can be worked out mathematically with reasonable accuracy (granted based on assumptions about the origin of the threat that may be fleeting or incomplete, and, more importantly, assumptions of system effectiveness that may not reflect reality.) The question of interest is would the additional facilities produce a net benefit, and is there a system configuration that is agreeable to both Russia and the US? If the Russians accept that their proposals will be ancillary, and those systems are pursued just to mollify Russia, then we may be throwing money into a hole. If the Russians don’t accept the system that is built on top of the system that they originally objected to, is it worth alienating them to build the system. While we don’t want to forget that an Iranian Ballistic Missile threat is on the horizon, we should also not forget that the threat posed by Russia is ever-present. The Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty may just be the first in a trail of abandoned treaties that will result from diminished US - Russian relations. Certainly, we can expect that the Russians won’t be eager to make good on the Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty (SORT, a.k.a. the Moscow Treaty) reductions if they believe there are plans to erect a system that might ultimately make a first strike against them a feasible option.
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