At the NATO Ministerial meeting being held in Bucharest, Romania, there was unanimous support for a missile defense system in Europe. The system would include a radar installation located in the Czech Republic and interceptor missiles located in Poland.

While the NATO countries are broadly supportive of the system, it, along with the inexorable expansion of NATO from the east, serves as yet another thorn in the side of Russia. Russia has increasingly been eager to rebel against events that challenge its national status or that are perceived to denigrate its security. Furthermore, Russia is in a better position to do so than it has been for a number of  years because of its enhanced financial position.

The Bush Administration has repeatedly attempted to point out that the system is not directed at Russia, but rather at Iran. And, in fact, the US has gone to the extent of offering to tie the activation of the system to the development of a credible missile threat from Iran. That is, as long as there is no reason to believe that Iran has missiles with the effective range to attack Europe, the system would not become operational.

It seems that there is both a security concern and a face-saving concern on the part of the Russians. Just as the US has hinted at compromise, Russia has made its own statements intended to increase cooperation, and to avoid leaving itself in the position of an impotent observer of the construction of the missile defense system. Russia offered to help create a system that would use the Qabala (Gabala), Azerbaijan radar site instead of the proposed Czech site. The Bush Administration retorted that it would consider the use of the Azerbaijan site in addition to, but not instead of, the Czech site. Russia has also intimated that it would not be averse to the interceptors being located in Iraq, Turkey, or at sea.

What is behind the Bush Administration’s unwillingness to change plans, but merely to augment their existing plans? There is an explanation based in the physical realities. It has been argued that the boost-phase is the ideal period to intercept a missile because of the relatively slow movement of the accelerating projectile and the relatively large size (i.e. the rocket is still attached) of the target.  The Azerbaijan site would be valuable because it is much closer and would give earlier warning. However, it would also not give much time to get interceptors up and on target.  The decision about whether the radar indication was true or false would have to be much faster, because Iranian missiles would be out of range quickly otherwise. I don’t know what the difference in probability is of actually intercepting a missile whether using the closer versus farther installation, but I know the idea of having to respond more rapidly might not be preferable. Shooting off interceptors without time to notify others of what one is doing might cause alarm, and radar systems are not absolutely accurate. I can also imagine that there are advantages to being able to track the projectile for some time after it separates from the rocket and its trajectory is already been determined.

Of course, a number of questions that have been brought up in previous entries of this blog remain. a.) By the time missile defense technology is mastered, will ballistic missiles be an obsolete delivery system? b.) Is the threat posed by Iran – which may someday have both nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles – greater than that posed by a scorned Russia who mastered those technologies decades ago? c.) Are defensive and deterrent strategies completely irreconcilable?