The seating of a high ranking American diplomat, Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs William Burns, at talks with the Iranian Nuclear negotiator in meetings in Geneva - even if only as an observer – is a welcome change in the Bush policy. While it would be nice to have someone actually at the table in a negotiating role, baby-steps are better than no steps. In conjunction with the talks with North Korea, this represents a change from a policy under which the US does not talk to opponents until they have ceded to US demands. One has to wonder if humanity would have survived had the Cold War been run with such an approach to international affairs. That is, if we had refused to talk to, or have diplomatic relations with, the Soviet Union until after they surrendered influence in all Central European countries, implemented human rights reforms, and eliminated unwelcome influence in developing nations in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. (I’m certain that there were people arguing for just that, this brand of Neoconservatism isn’t all that new. It’s just that it has only recently had its time in the sun after being considered lunatic fringe – a position to which it may be fortunately returning) Instead, we maintained diplomatic relations with the Soviets throughout, including tense times such at the Cuban Missile Crisis.
The New York Times reported that John Bolton called the move a sign of “the Administration’s complete intellectual collapse.” This is exceptionally ironic as I think that most students of diplomacy, including the vast majority of conservative international relations experts, would consider these moves as signs of intellectual life.
The stance of not being involved in negotiations until after one has won the concessions one seeks is an interesting position to come from people who pride themselves on being bold, because it seems so cowardly. It is as if they don’t believe that the US can hold its own in negotiations, but rather will be run roughshod over by the negotiators of Kim Jong Il or Ahmedinejad if they even enter into negotiations. An admittedly cynical way to view this neocon stance is that it is a way to ensure that progress not made. Some of these individuals may have been mortified when the Reagan Administration began negotiating with Gorbachev, and Gorbachev began giving way the farm. I would hate to think that there are people shaping policy who are influenced by stock positions in defense firms, but I find this fear of negotiations hard to explain. Perhaps we have not been cautious enough in following Eisenhower’s admonition to guard against the influence of the Military-Industrial Complex in politics.
As the title of this post states, “you can’t win if you don’t play.” International diplomacy is a game of strategy, and, as such, refusing to move does not create game-winning conditions but rather stagnation. By ”winning” I am just talking about achieving one’s objective at a cost that is acceptable (at or below ones reservation price.) This is obviously counter to the common definition in which there is no possible overlap of acceptable outcomes, such that one side’s ”win” is inherently the other side’s “loss.” The point is, the opposition has no incentive to consider ones demands if one does not have a seat at the table. They can maintain their existing trajectory. After all, with no one at the table, there is no ability to offer anything for which they might find it worth altering their course. There is no company that would do business with a firm that said: “we won’t negotiate a contract until you conceded to all these things that we want first.” If a business did say such a thing, one might expect they had little to offer.
