If the reporting about the conflict in Georgia is representative, there seem to be a great many Georgians who feel the US and European Union left them out in the cold by delivering a limited rhetorical response to Russia’s decision to take the conflict beyond the boundaries of South Ossetia. Soldiers and citizens interviewed have expressed an expectation that some form of vigorous response should have been forthcoming, particularly from the US. The US has been closely allied with Georgia, and Georgian military forces are serving in Iraq (though most of the contingent have now returned to Georgia.)   

Georgia’s entry into South Ossetia last Thursday (August 7th) seems to have been ill-conceived. If Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili thought Russia would not respond, it is hard to understand what he could base such an assumption upon. Russia is now in a strong place, and is eager to affirm this new state of affairs in the minds of the rest of the world. Supposedly the US State Department warned the Georgians of as much,  saying that the Russians would probably not limit their response proportionally. Furthermore, by initiating the interruption to the stability of the existing status quo, the Georgians created ideal conditions for the Russians to take firm control over the moral high ground. Few neutral parties seem to be arguing that Russia was out-of-bounds in repelling the Georgian attacks out of South Ossetia, what is disconcerting is their actions to split the country in half.  

It is unclear whether the Georgian leadership believed they would have outside support when they moved into South Ossetia late last week, but, if they did, it would not be the first time a country misconstrued what their alliance with the US “bought” them. In 1956, the Hungarians engaged in an uprising that led to the Soviet Union’s temporary withdrawal followed by a vicious return. There were many who thought that the US would support the Hungarians if they took the first step. This was, of course, an unrewarded case of wishful thinking. It should be noted that Eisenhower’s stance, as stated by Allen Dulles, was that the US could not involve itself militarily in such a conflict. However, the Hungarians were apparently getting mixed messages covertly from people like Frank Wisner (who apparently very much believed that the US would lend active support to the Hungarian Revolutionaries, so much so that the guilt likely contributed immensely to the mental breakdown resulting in his suicide.) While it is true that many Hungarians probably did not expect US assistance, and some, in fact, hoped to avoid such outside involvment because it would be tantamount to World War III with Budapest playing the role of fifty-yard line. Of course, the case of Hungary was much different in that the Hungarians initiated hostilities against an outside power that was exerting control over it, which is much less morally ambiguous than attacking those that are - depending upon one’s perspective - either in an autonomous region or are citizens of one’s own country.

The fact of the matter is that the US, while incredibly powerful, has a finite ability to affect change by force, and, these days, is stretched to its limits. Because of this, it is crucially important that America be extremely clear with respect to its intentions to come to the aid of others – or not to – such as the case may be. The US has a rather muddled history when it comes to such communications. A prime example can be seen in the period foreshadowing the 1991 Gulf War. The ambiguous messages delivered by diplomats such as April Glaspie gave plenty of room for Saddam Hussein to think that American intervention would not be forthcoming if he invaded Kuwait. American leaders must be aware that the unique hegemonic status of the US leaves considerable latitude for the leaders of allied nations to misinterpret the extent of support America is willing and able to offer. The US must also be cognizant that countries may have expectations when they ally with the US. It is, therefore, exceedingly important to avoid mixed signals.