RoK Navy Ships Like Those Involved in Skirmish

The navies of North and South Korea engaged in a brief, 2-3 minute, skirmish that resulted in the North Korean ship returning to port for repair. The engagement occurred after a North Korean ship apparently ventured across a limit line off the west coast of the peninsula and then failed to heed an extended volley of warning shots. There were no South Korean casualties.

There seems to be a widespread belief that the North Koreans engaged in the provocation to send a signal in advance of President Obama’s impending  trip to Asia. Incidentally, the US recently announced that it would send a special envoy, Stephen Bosworth, to North Korea to engage in talks on North Korea’s nuclear weapons program.  Of course, this rationale may or may not be accurate. For all we know, the North Korean captain and crew were attempting to carry out a “Hunt-for-Red-October-esque” defection plot. However, the hypothesis about sending a message does seem consistent with North Korean behavior historically, which tends toward the provocative and crisis bargaining.

Assuming that the North Korean action is an attempt to either send a message or influence behavior, what is the goal and how does Kim Jong Il imagine this behavior will translate into his objective? From this side of the street one might assume that the provocative action is designed to push the Obama Administration away from the negotiating table. One does not have to have a great understanding of American politics to understand that the more North Korea engages in provocation, the more it makes it impossible for President Obama to extend an olive branch. While the President may enjoy creating a more peaceful tone for global diplomacy and a large swath of the American citizenry may support him in this, he is also well aware that politically he cannot afford to respond to aggression with conversation or concession. More broadly than just the President, the Democratic Party realizes that one of its greatest Achilles’ Heels is an appearance of weakness that the American public finds unappealing in times of crisis. Of course, this assumes that Kim Jong Il has internalized the old lesson from Sun Tzu, and that he knows his enemy as well as himself. The evidence doesn’t seem to support this in that what Kim Jong Il says he wants often seems to be paired with actions that are designed to do anything but achieve his stated goals.

A second possibility is that Kim wants to negotiate but wants to avoid starting from a position in which his country is seen as the weak party in the negotiation. I suspect this is what most people refer to when they say that Kim Jong Il ordered his Navy to be provocative because of Obama’s visit. This raises the question of how provoking a naval force whose capabilities seem to be several generations ahead of yours achieves this goal. The somewhat predictable outcome of the North Korean ship returning to port in flames while the South Korean ships remain untouched does not seem to bode well for an expression of strength. However, there is an alternative to showing strength by might, and that is showing strength by way of the will to be kooky. That is, Kim Jong Il may be saying: “Look I know my country is poor and seems too weak to have leverage, but I am willing to press things to the limit so don’t discount me.”

There is another possibility, and that derives from the inability to segregate domestic from foreign messages. That is, Kim Jong Il may be trying to convince his people that the dynasty is still alive and well without having any intended message for actors abroad. I have not heard much about Kim Jong Il’s successor in all this, but internally there may be an attempt to build some gravitas for him.

I don’t know what resides in the mind of Kim Jong Il or Kim Jong Un, but it seems clear they need better advice on strategy.