Source: www.kremlin.ru

The venerated first Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) will expire on December 5, 2009. The importance of this treaty lies not merely in the fact that it reduced the numbers of nuclear warheads and the platforms on which they reside in both the Soviet and US arsenals (later the five weapon holding successor states of the Soviet Union and the US.) Perhaps more important were the unprecedented levels of verification and information exchange incorporated into the Treaty- a codification of President Reagan’s often quoted “trust, but verify” line.

Currently, negotiations are underway to replace the expiring START. Reports indicate that there are two major outstanding bones of contention. The first involves the issue of ground-based mobile launchers, which the Russians have but the US does not. The US would apparently like to see more control over them, but the Russians object to what they see as a unilateral concession. This may be a gambit in search of a concession on the US side. The second issue deals with the details of the allowable numbers of various weapon platforms.

There has been talk in the US Senate of extending START I six months because, even if a new treaty is concluded in the next three weeks, it won’t be ratified and enter into force until much later.

RoK Navy Ships Like Those Involved in Skirmish

The navies of North and South Korea engaged in a brief, 2-3 minute, skirmish that resulted in the North Korean ship returning to port for repair. The engagement occurred after a North Korean ship apparently ventured across a limit line off the west coast of the peninsula and then failed to heed an extended volley of warning shots. There were no South Korean casualties.

There seems to be a widespread belief that the North Koreans engaged in the provocation to send a signal in advance of President Obama’s impending  trip to Asia. Incidentally, the US recently announced that it would send a special envoy, Stephen Bosworth, to North Korea to engage in talks on North Korea’s nuclear weapons program.  Of course, this rationale may or may not be accurate. For all we know, the North Korean captain and crew were attempting to carry out a “Hunt-for-Red-October-esque” defection plot. However, the hypothesis about sending a message does seem consistent with North Korean behavior historically, which tends toward the provocative and crisis bargaining.

Assuming that the North Korean action is an attempt to either send a message or influence behavior, what is the goal and how does Kim Jong Il imagine this behavior will translate into his objective? From this side of the street one might assume that the provocative action is designed to push the Obama Administration away from the negotiating table. One does not have to have a great understanding of American politics to understand that the more North Korea engages in provocation, the more it makes it impossible for President Obama to extend an olive branch. While the President may enjoy creating a more peaceful tone for global diplomacy and a large swath of the American citizenry may support him in this, he is also well aware that politically he cannot afford to respond to aggression with conversation or concession. More broadly than just the President, the Democratic Party realizes that one of its greatest Achilles’ Heels is an appearance of weakness that the American public finds unappealing in times of crisis. Of course, this assumes that Kim Jong Il has internalized the old lesson from Sun Tzu, and that he knows his enemy as well as himself. The evidence doesn’t seem to support this in that what Kim Jong Il says he wants often seems to be paired with actions that are designed to do anything but achieve his stated goals.

A second possibility is that Kim wants to negotiate but wants to avoid starting from a position in which his country is seen as the weak party in the negotiation. I suspect this is what most people refer to when they say that Kim Jong Il ordered his Navy to be provocative because of Obama’s visit. This raises the question of how provoking a naval force whose capabilities seem to be several generations ahead of yours achieves this goal. The somewhat predictable outcome of the North Korean ship returning to port in flames while the South Korean ships remain untouched does not seem to bode well for an expression of strength. However, there is an alternative to showing strength by might, and that is showing strength by way of the will to be kooky. That is, Kim Jong Il may be saying: “Look I know my country is poor and seems too weak to have leverage, but I am willing to press things to the limit so don’t discount me.”

There is another possibility, and that derives from the inability to segregate domestic from foreign messages. That is, Kim Jong Il may be trying to convince his people that the dynasty is still alive and well without having any intended message for actors abroad. I have not heard much about Kim Jong Il’s successor in all this, but internally there may be an attempt to build some gravitas for him.

I don’t know what resides in the mind of Kim Jong Il or Kim Jong Un, but it seems clear they need better advice on strategy.

In the Fall of 2002  I drafted an essay that became a Cato Institute Policy Analysis paper on why invading Iraq was a bad idea. In essence, the paper used rational actor theory to propose that there were better ways to address the threat to US security interests posed by Iraq, to the extent such threats existed, than by going to war. Now, seven years later, it is interesting to revisit the subject.

What made me think about this the recent discussion about a surge for Afghanistan. General McChrystal’s suggestion that 40,000 additional troops need to be introduced into the theatre raised quite a stir in the news. However, there seems to be a widespread opinion among military leaders that the 40,000 could not begin to be introduced until the new year, and could not fully be in place until late next year (presuming that they would all come from the US.) Perhaps President Obama’s delayed response is due to an attempt to figure out where they could get these troops in a reasonable timeframe. It is telling that despite a budget of over half a trillion dollars (not counting supplementals) and a military of over three million people when all branches and reserves are included, we cannot come up with 40,000 troops. Of course, few of the three million are relevant to the task at hand (i.e. sending F-16 mechanics or submariner firemen to Afghanistan is not that useful), but this raises a question for another day about why our military seems to be so ill-tailored to the wars it fights. However, the point to note here is that we can’t come up with 40,000 troops because many of the relevant troops are either in Iraq, already in Afghanistan, or are momentarily  rotated out of one of our two war zones long enough to keep their private lives in order and their sanity intact.

Let me acknowledge first that I, at least, was as fooled as anyone about the likelihood that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and /or programs for WMD. Readers of past posts will note that I place little stock in the ability to know or predict behavior absent first-hand knowledge. Despite the sound advice of Sun Tzu that we cannot know an enemy’s capabilities (much less their intentions) without first-hand information (e.g. through spies) and that such knowledge cannot be derived from oracles, humanity still thinks it can – except our oracles are probabilistic risk models. That said, in the absence of certain knowledge one is forced to make a best guess based on a reasonable reading of past actions and the available  indicators. I maintain that, given the uncertainty, it was not unreasonable to think that Iraq had WMD, and, at any rate, the advice given was optimal whether Iraq had WMD or not. The fact that Hussein did not have WMD by no means invalidates but rather bolsters the core message of the paper that (even believing that there were chemical weapons or worse) the threat to US security interests was overblown, and, to the extent these threats existed, they could be handled more effectively without force.

The question at hand here is whether we are better off having attacked Iraq, and I would maintain that we are certainly not at the moment. If, unlikely as it may be, we are threatened tomorrow by an actual threat to our existence or fundamental strategic interests we would be slow and hard-pressed to respond because we are stretched thin by the war in Iraq. True, there is one less dictator in the world. Nice as that may sound, as long as that dictator is not ruling the US, it is not a good measure of whether US interests are improved.

One issue to consider is the threat posed by the perception of the US as a “high capability – low will” state. I don’t suspect we have any enemies that think the capability of the US military is anything but extremely high. Our military is technologically without peer, and is, at best, matched by few in terms of the level of training and morale of forces (I would contend that an all-voluntary military is a force-multiplier unto itself, particularly after spending so much time studying the Russian system and its influence on combat-effectiveness when I was a graduate student .) However, there is also a perception that the US has a limited stomach for warfare, and will not see its engagements through to the end. This problem is created when a country is a little too fast-and-loose in going to war. Its danger is that it decreases the perception of other states of the cost of conflict with America and makes them more likely to engage in activities that may be viewed as threatening.

Frankly, I am astounded at the relatively slow erosion of support for conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan that is, I presume, a mix of the influence of the 9-11 events on the national psyche and a detachment of the average American to these distant wars. The erosion is present none-the-less. It is not unreasonable that American support for the war in Iraq has diminished. The outcome of the conflict fundamentally affects the way people in Iraq live but not substantially how Americans live, and so it is a given that people over there will be willing to fight long after our will wanes. You may remember hearing a line during the political debates to the effect that ”Timelines to withdraw would be a boon to insurgents and radical elements”. I hate to break it to those critics, but whether we leave now, next year, or in 20 years, some radical element will be around to claim victory. 

The US needs to look at war more like it looks at nuclear war. In other words, it is an extreme action against dire attacks against the national existence or critical national interests and should not be engaged in lightly, and that, having made the decision, we will fully accept the consequences of war and see the conflict through to a definitive end. War as a means to reach limited objectives such as tweaking the world into a more palatable form – as I would suggest was the case in Iraq – is a dangerous game. 

Unfortunately, we are really only mid-course in the conflict in Iraq, so knowing the degree to which we will be better or worse off after than before the war remains unclear. If our government (both the Bush and Obama administrations) is correct in its prevailing presumption that we can leave an Iraq that is democratic, stable, and friendly to the US we may end up better off. However, we live in a world where uncertainty is inexorable, and there are other scenarios, that we cannot accurately judge the likelihood of, that may make us worse off. The most prominent of these alternative scenarios is that the Shia majority takes control and reciprocates against a minority that oppressed them for decades. Under this scenario, we will have essentially built an Iraq – Iran alliance that will make any involvement we have in the Persian Gulf region more challenging and may shake up regional stability.

Iran’s President Ahmedinejad has a lot to keep straight. When he’s inside Iran, the Holocaust didn’t happen, but when abroad it did happen (no, may have happened?) – but is irrelevant to today’s world. Is it any wonder that it would have slipped his mind to mention to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that Iran was building another uranium enrichment facility until, once again, Tehran was caught with its hand in the cookie jar.

This does answer a question that I’ve asked many times, which is how Iran intended to get from its current position to having a nuclear weapon without the intervening event of having its offending nuclear infrastructure bombed to smithereens. There were essentially two paths available to an Iran bent on having the bomb. The first was to build yet another covert facility (which is apparently what Tehran chose to do.) The second, and this is the one I’ve never heard a convincing explanation of the process by which it could succeed, would be a “strategic breakout” of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) regime. The idea of strategic breakout is to get all your ducks in a row, and then withdraw from the NPT and kick inspectors out of the country / remove surveillance equipment. The problem with this is that it is essentially saying “we’d like to build our atomic bomb now, please leave us in peace.” While it is true that they could get a lot of their affairs in order, there would seem to be plenty of time between their announcement and the production and machining of the requisite material to allow a country to bomb the facilities into oblivion, perhaps even with a Security Council resolution in hand.  The second covert facility was the only path I’ve ever suspected was workable, though there have been proponents of a strategic breakout scenario.

This building of covert facilities only to have them discovered has got to get prohibitively expensive at some point. I’m not saying Allah is trying to send you a message, Mr. Ahmedinejad, but maybe you should consider it a hint. Allah might just find an Iran with a nuclear weapon to be as disturbing a prospect as the rest of us do.

Two news stories this morning highlight the bold independent-mindedness of a couple of South Asian scientists, and how they might yet manage to get tens of millions of people killed.

The first story involves the complete unshackling of Abdul Qadeer Khan from the last “official” vestiges of restriction on his movement. [I say "official" because he probably can't leave the country without being abducted for interrogation - there remains a great deal that is unknown about the extent of his proliferation network and who it gave what.] Better known in the West as A.Q. Khan, this Pakistani national hero is responsible for spreading the technology and knowledge necessary to build nuclear bombs to anyone willing and able to pay. Among most well-known customers are / were Iran, North Korea, and Libya. While Libya has since verifiably disarmed of Weapons of Mass Destruction and the technologies used to produce them and is in such good stead that they are now being handed back their brutal terrorists from decades past, Iran and North Korea are probably both much closer to a working nuclear weapon than they would have been without the “Johnny Appleseed of Nuclear Weapons”, Khan. While Islamists love to portray Khan as a great equilizer who has helped spread nuclear weapons technology in the Islamic world, they forget that North Korea, whose position on religion is that it is the opiate of the masses and should either be brutally crushed or usurped by the party, was also a customer. This makes Khan more of a greedy bastard who is willing to put the whole world in peril to make some cash than any kind of hero to Islam.

The other story involves Indian scientist, K Santhanam, who claims that his country’s 1998 test of a thermonuclear device was actually a dud. Santhanam goes on to state that because of this unexpectedly low yeild, that India needs to conduct further testing in order to have a reliable nuclear deterrent. The Indian government and high-ranking military officers have dismissed this suggestion. Why might a citizen of India shout from the roof-tops that his country’s strategic forces are defective? [If you were worried that a criminal had entered your house, would you shout out that you didn't have a gun?] A prevailing theory is that not only do Santhanam and a few others want more tests to be conducted, they want to put the kibosh on any momentum toward India’s signing and ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The CTBT will have a profound impact on nonproliferation because members that don’t have nuclear weapons won’t be able to develop any sophisticated weapons while complying with the treaty, and states that do have nuclear weapons will not be able to build new models.

India’s first indigenously-built nuclear reactor-propelled submarine today begins a two year shake-down that, if successful, will result in its addition to the fleet of the Indian Navy. It is interesting to consider the potential strategic ramifications of the sub. It should be noted that this is not India’s first submarine (it has purchased from other countries in the past – notably Russia, who was credited in assisting in this project as well) and that, as mentioned, it’s launch ceremony is not synonymous with it entering service because it is still untried.

In general, nuclear submarines have a mixed influence on strategic stability. A  sub’s ability to hide beneath the seas and to operate there exceptionally quietly for extended periods, means that it is a weapons platform whose survivability is high. This is consistent with deterrence theory. A state needs survivable weapons so that the enemy knows that massive retaliation to an attack is imminent, and that there is no use in trying to swamp an enemy’s deterrent capability.

On the other hand, submarines make the opponent exceedingly concerned about the sub owner’s intentions. Because a sub can pop up off-shore and launch along varying azimuths relatively close and without warning, there is a fear that they will be used to eliminate the enemy’s retaliatory capability as part of a plan to negate the opposition’s deterrent. Both China and Pakistan have small arsenals, and are, therefore, theoretically vulnerable to having their deterrent destroyed by a first strike. In reality China’s deterrent is apparently heavily fortified by being built into a mountain and is not so tiny as to make an opponent confident about knocking it out.

It should be noted that Prime Minister Singh emphasized during the launch speach that India did not have agressive intentions with the new weapon system . Of course, talk is cheap, and whether Pakistan and China believe the rhetoric will be determined by more than word choice. It will be interesting to see what effect, if any, the new system has on regional stability.

The magnitude of the United States’ Department of Defense (DoD) is, on many levels, awe-inspiring. This led me to create this little trivia game called “DoD or Country” that considers which is larger in various aspects - our defense complex or given countries. I hope you enjoy it. The anwers appear below. Don’t peak.

 Questions:  

1.) Weighing in at $583 billion US dollars, which is more expensive: the US DoD budget or the budget of the entire government of Australia?

2.) At 9,500 square kilometers, which is more extensive: America’s largest military installation -White Sands Missile Range – or the country of Cyprus?

3.) Consisting of about 3,600,000 people, which is larger: the combined active, reserve, and civilian components of the DoD or the population of Mongolia?

4.) At 440,000 barrels per day, who consumed more oil in 2006: the Department of Defense or the country of Argentina?

5.) Consisting of 45 ships, which is larger: the US Naval Fleet Auxillary Force (i.e. the ships that supply the Navy’s combat fleet) or the merchant marine fleet of Lithuania? 

6.) Consisting of 185 aircraft, which contains more aircraft:  the current C-17 cargo plane fleet of the US Air Force or the current Singapore Airline’s fleet (all models of aircraft combined)?

7.) At 764 dead, which involved a greater number of lost lives: the US military’s Killed in Action figure for 2007 or the number of fatalities due to terrorism (as defined by the US NCTC) in Somalia in the same year.

8.)At 2,150 Megawatts (electrical) [MW(e)], which has a higher combined output rating from all nuclear reactors: all of the active  aircraft carriers of the US Navy or all the commercial nuclear power plants in Brazil?

Answers:

1.) DoD; Australia’s annual budget in the same year (2008) was a mere $340 billion.

2.) Cyprus; White Sands is 8,300 square kilometers (1,2oo km. sq. less.)

3.) DoD; Mongolia’s population is only about 3.041 million.

4.) Argentina; The South American nation’s oil consumption was 120,000 barrels per day more.

5.) Lithuania; The Baltic state’s fleet consists of about five more merchant ships than the US Navy’s Auxillary force. (Perhaps a few more than that depending upon how you define “ship.”)

6.) DoD; The Air Force has almost 80 more C-17s (of all varients) than the Singapore Airline has in total aircraft (of all models.)

7.) DoD; The DoD reported 25 more killed in action in 2007 than was the number of Somali terrorism fatalities (739) that year.

8.) DoD; Brazil’s two reactors are rated at 2,007 MW(e), while the 10 Nimitz and one Enterprise class carriers have ratings of 194 MW(e) (both reactors on a Nimitz combined [times 10]) and 210 MW(e) (all eight Enterprise reactors combined).

Is Iran on the verge of a revolution? Can Kim Jong Un maintain power if his father transfers it to him in the near future? Are we seeing the leading indicators of America’s decline in conditions like debt that is completely out of control, failing business giants, the crippling costs of persistent asymmetric warfare, and looming unaddressed crises such as the mathematically infeasible pay-go social security system? What will the rise of massive high-growth emerging economies mean for world affairs? What will the world look like politically, economically, and diplomatically 3 months from now?; 6 months?; 1 year?; 2 years?  

We are living in interesting times. We could be on the precipice of some very major changes to the international system. Sometimes change is slow and evolutionary; sometimes it is faster and more revolutionary; and, rarely but occasionally, the conditions evolve to converge to the point where it is catastrophically instantaneous. There is a vigorous tug of war in progress between inertia and the winds of change.

I would love to be able to make some definitive predictions about what the world will look like next year. Like the vast majority of people, I am motivated by discomfort with uncertainty to want to think that I can have a grasp on how events will unfold. However, the lesson (an unintended lesson to be sure) that has most stuck with me in completing graduate degrees in International Relations and Economics  is that anyone who thinks they can predict the future unfolding of large-scale political and economic events is full of crap. This will no doubt be considered heresy to many who have made lucrative livings because we (as a species) would rather pay millions to someone who makes an incorrect prediction than to accept that we have no idea what will transpire. One can read papers that misapply probabilistic and statistical models in some of the most elite scholarly journals because even the most educated of our society are addicted to thinking that the future can be known in a system whose level of complexity remains beyond our capacity to unravel.

My advice to those trying to get a handle on the future, save your soothsayer money, hedge your bets, and enjoy the ride.

In the past I have always found the Central News Agency of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) (see: http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm) to be less than compelling and rarely worthy of examination. The stories are generally about how such-and-such Sub-Saharan African dictator sent congratulations to Kim Jong Il, or how the North Korean People wished to pay their respects to such-and-such nation. In essence, it was not only propaganda, but propaganda of the dullest and most mundane sort imaginable.

However, in recent weeks it is becoming increasingly worthwhile to visit the Agency’s site. Oh, it is still wild propaganda, but it is entertaining propaganda. Consider some of the current headlines:

“US Wild Ambition to Dominate Whole of Korea Can Never Come True”

“US Termed Chief Culprit of Nuclear Proliferation”

“Japanese Reactionaries Urged to Stop Their Rash Acts”

This last one is particularly amusing. It essentially rebukes elements inside Japan who would like that country to develop nuclear weapons. The irony is, of course, that the only way the Japanese will be sufficiently motivated to make major changes in their law as required to build a nuclear arsenal is in response to the continued provocations of their nutty newly nuclear neighbor who is constantly shooting missile tests across their bow lately.

Today the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) passed sanctions against North Korea consisting primarily of a complete arms export embargo and a partial arms import embargo. The big news seems to be China’s support for these efforts. While Chinese diplomats were careful to state that inspections must be carried out in accordance with international law, and, therefore, the sanctions did not equate to open season on DPRK shipping, they did go along with the provisions as stipulated. The Chinese don’t want a nuclear armed Japan any more than the North Koreans do. The difference is that the Chinese recognize that the way to avoid a Japan with nuclear weapons is a sane and stable North Korea.

Besides the long-range missile test that was earlier estimated would take place early next week, it will be interesting to see of what the North Korean response consists. As I have mentioned before, when you go as provocative as nuclear weapons tests, it is hard to up the ante without risking war. While the North Korean rhetoric is harsh, it is difficult to imagine what North Korea can do besides the same old bag of tricks it has been playing.

On April 5th, President Obama gave a masterful speech in Prague, the later half of which was devoted to the topic of nuclear disarmament. The speech began with an homage to people who acted on a belief that change could be achieved against an overwhelming sentiment that it could not (referring, of course, to the Cold War), and then implied that people of the same ilk were needed to advance disarmament in a similar manner.

Those wishing to see any momentum that may have been created by this speech derailed could hardly ask for better intervening world events. North Korea conducted its second test of a nuclear device, and, in the process, displayed an improved capability had been achieved. Following the nuclear test, they proceeded to set off short-range missiles like  some sort of Independence Day display, and it appears that they are preparing for a long-range missile test in up-coming weeks. Meanwhile, the Iran front remains unchanged. In other words, the Iranians are getting progressively closer to having an infrastructure that would support making weapons-grade fissile material in sufficient quantities within a reasonable time period, and this is making many countries (re: Israel) really unnerved.

It might be argued that such events are a potential boon to disarmament because they underscore the nature of the threat and give impetus for positive action. After all, nonproliferation is unlikely to go anywhere without the major nuclear weapon states showing progress toward disarmament. If the 2010 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) review conference turns out to be a carryover from 2005, then we can expect backward and not forward momentum on nonproliferation. 

Unfortunately, I suspect that current events do not bode well for advancing the agenda President Obama laid out in his Prague Speech. Nuclear weapon states will only ease their grasp if they feel relatively safe from the threat of attack by states. I emphasize “by states” because I don’t think world leaders give much sway to deterrence as a strategy against nuclear terrorism, but they are pretty confident about the value of deterrence against states. While the threat of nuclear terrorism may (or may not) be on the rise, I don’t think that is a non-starter for disarmament. However, the same cannot be said of risk from states.

As the President stated, nuclear disarmament is not likely to be achieve quickly. There were a number of steps that were laid out that are considered intermediary steps including: reduction of the relevance of nuclear weapons to overall security, bilateral reductions between US and Russia, enactment the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), verifiable implementation of the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT), strengthening of inspection authority, development of a fuel bank, and progress with North Korea and Iran.

The question is whether all of these are necessary, and, if so, whether any of them are intractable. Take, for example, the question of verifiability of the FMCT. The Bush Administration dropped this treaty supposedly because it was “impossible” to verify. The present administration seems to take as a forgone conclusion that it can be verified. This tells us one of two things. The best case scenario is that the two camps are working under different assumptions about what constitutes a minimally acceptable level of verification. I say this is the “best case” because there would ostensibly be underlying facts that could be agreed upon, and, therefore, there would be a map to understand what would be necessary to move towards a negotiated agreement (e.g. what technological developments.) The worst case is that politics is leading the facts and science- in which case there may be no room for agreement. By “politics leading” I mean that either the Bush Administration started from from the position that they did not want to support the FMCT and found arguing the unprovable case of non-verifiability a good means to quash it, or the Obama Administration started from the position that they wanted the FMCT and knew it required arguing that it was, in fact, verifiable, or, given the possibility that no one knows the answer yet, both of the above. If this is the case, then there is no incentive for either side to reduce ambiguity, and little prospect for moving forward.

When there is a point of intractability, one needs to determine whether there is a new approach to the subject that can be taken, and what it might be. Too often there is a failure to recognize points of intractability, and then to be creative about how to change the underlying conditions to one where progress is possible.