Iran’s President Ahmedinejad has a lot to keep straight. When he’s inside Iran, the Holocaust didn’t happen, but when abroad it did happen (no, may have happened?) – but is irrelevant to today’s world. Is it any wonder that it would have slipped his mind to mention to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that Iran was building another uranium enrichment facility until, once again, Tehran was caught with its hand in the cookie jar.

This does answer a question that I’ve asked many times, which is how Iran intended to get from its current position to having a nuclear weapon without the intervening event of having its offending nuclear infrastructure bombed to smithereens. There were essentially two paths available to an Iran bent on having the bomb. The first was to build yet another covert facility (which is apparently what Tehran chose to do.) The second, and this is the one I’ve never heard a convincing explanation of the process by which it could succeed, would be a “strategic breakout” of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) regime. The idea of strategic breakout is to get all your ducks in a row, and then withdraw from the NPT and kick inspectors out of the country / remove surveillance equipment. The problem with this is that it is essentially saying “we’d like to build our atomic bomb now, please leave us in peace.” While it is true that they could get a lot of their affairs in order, there would seem to be plenty of time between their announcement and the production and machining of the requisite material to allow a country to bomb the facilities into oblivion, perhaps even with a Security Council resolution in hand.  The second covert facility was the only path I’ve ever suspected was workable, though there have been proponents of a strategic breakout scenario.

This building of covert facilities only to have them discovered has got to get prohibitively expensive at some point. I’m not saying Allah is trying to send you a message, Mr. Ahmedinejad, but maybe you should consider it a hint. Allah might just find an Iran with a nuclear weapon to be as disturbing a prospect as the rest of us do.

It may be true that there isn’t any reason to expect that Iran’s position on its fuel cycle facility policy will change  regardless of who wins tomorrow’s election. After all, the Ayatollah Khamenei is the Supreme Leader, and does dictate policy on issues at that strategic a level. However, with Mr. Mousavi holding his own, we may yet see what can happen without the Howard Stern of heads of state in the Presidency of Iran.

It may, in fact, be a test case for the role of harsh rhetoric in international diplomacy. Are acrimonious words just for the benefit of domestic consumption and devoid of any influence on foreign policy outcomes. Or, on the other hand, can less vitriol translate into gains at the negotiating table? With both a US and Iranian leadership that is less prone to engage in harsh language, will we see progress toward reduction of the threat or not?

Technology Review’s  “Top Ten Emerging Technologies for 2009″ issue is now out. (see: http://www.technologyreview.com/specialreports/specialreport.aspx?id=37)  Among the ten technologies anticipated to “change the way we live” is the Traveling Wave Reactor design developed by Intellectual Ventures. Intellectual Ventures is a Bellevue, Washington company founded by a couple former Microsoft executives that combines venture capitalism with research and development. The reactor in question would internally convert some of the non-fissile isotopes in natural uranium into fissionable components, and, therefore, breed its own fuel.

If its promise can be realized, such a reactor would offer a number of proliferation risk mitigating effects as well as some environmentally friendly benefits. First, it apparently reduces the amount of uranium enrichment that would be required. Apparently, the process uses only a small amount of uranium enriched in the Uranium-235 isotope, and, because it makes its own fuel, no fuel changes would be needed over the life of the plant. This means that the desire to build more enrichment plants globally to either meet expanding demand or to assuage supply disruption fears would be reduced. 

Second, it would presumably reduce the need to recycle / reprocess (proponents using the former term and opponents the later) spent nuclear fuel via external facilities, because this would be done internally within the reactor. Presently, good arguments have been offered for moving toward a closed fuel cycle ala France rather than the open one ala the US. An open cycle uses fuel once and then puts it into storage, a closed one (reprocessing/ recycling) extracts fissile material from the spent fuel and runs it through another reactor to get more electricity for the dollar. The arguments in favor of recycling fuel are based on both economics and environmental factors. For one thing, the closed cycle radically expands the amount of nuclear fuel that is available in the world. Another factor is that recycling the fuel reduces the amount of high-level radioactive waste that must be stored. 

So, given these upsides of recycling, why isn’t the US doing it? There are at least two reasons. One is that the process is expensive. Proponents of recycling will argue that not all the benefits are captured by those considering the expense of recycling. Such benefits include: a.)  a decreased amount that needs to be stored, and, thus, a need for fewer / smaller repositories; b.) a reduced longevity of the radioactivity of waste products; and c.) a vastly expanded stock of available fuel that will push out into the future the date at which short supplies lead to skyrocketing  prices. These may all be true, but the fact of the matter is that private companies don’t see it this way. This is because individual firms don’t calculate benefits accruing to society as a whole into their bottom lines, and the future is heavily discounted such that the difference between running out of nuclear fuel in hundreds of years versus tens of thousands of years is inconsequential (these timescales are  not based on calculations or even an educated guess, but are just a, possibly hyperbolic, literary device). This leaves government to take the task of capturing societal cost and benefits, but governments tend to be near-sighted themselves. 

The other downside of recycling or reprocessing is that the extracted fissile material from the spent fuel  translates into a potentially greater risk that such material will be diverted to military or criminal uses. Recycling involves transporting material, plutonium getting caught up in pipes, and whole new facilities to monitor. However, the traveling wave reactor would seem to achieves at least some of this within the reactor.  Since one can’t steal the fuel from inside a reactor (they tend to be both really hot and highly radioactive), some degree of recycling is achieved without the proliferation risk.

Before one gets too excited, it is important to realize that the reactor is at the moment a design, and idea. There are several hurdles that must be leapt before this technology can contribute to a change in the way we live. First, it has to be taken from a theoretically appealing concept to a physically preforming technology. The second, and no doubt harder chore, is that it must be made economically competitive with existing technologies. Finally, along the way there will be a number of powerful firms, in some cases closely tied to governments, that will stand to lose as such a technology takes over.

I tend to be inherently pessimistic; even when, as in this case, I am fundamentally ignorant of the technical issues involved. Things that are easily achieved are readily done, and most of what isn’t fails. That being said, I am hopeful that this and other technologies that can offer us the environmental benefits and energy security of nuclear power while simultaneously reducing the proliferation threats will succeed sooner rather than later.

Is Mossad, Israel’s foreign intelligence service, assassinating Iranian scientists involved with Tehran’s nuclear fuel program? A number of sources are reporting on this story whose origins seem to be in a Daily Telegrapharticle dated February 16th by Philip Sherwell. Most concretely, the Telegrapharticle reports on circulating rumors about Mossad’s involvement in the death of Ardeshire Hassanpour in 2007. Hassanpour was reportedly a high level scientist at Iran’s uranium conversion facility at Isfahan. However, the thrust of the article is a suggestion that Israeli covert efforts are likely to be stepped up because of fears that President Obama will be less likely to approve of Israeli military attacks and more likely to be obstructionist against such operations. Other than the reporting of rumors, there is not a great deal of solid accusations in the article. Therefore, it is difficult to draw conclusions about the factuality of the claim.

It should be noted that, if the Israelis are engaged in such activities, it is hard to imagine that they would be able to continue to succeed. Even if the Mossad is not running a covert war against Iran, the Iranian government, which has completely demonized Israel, is likely to believe the stories are true and to sequester the most crucial people. There are people in the Iranian government who would readily accept a claim that Israelis grind up their elderly for plant-food, let alone something as unexceptional as that they are involved in a covert campaign of assassination and sabotage to slow down Iran’s progress in the realm of the nuclear fuel cycle.

Given Iran’s enthusiasm for the destruction of Israel, it would be difficult to fault the Israelis if they did form such a plan in desperation. However, the challenge of succeeding in such a task is considerable, and the potential for impacts deleterious to Israel’s well-being would be high. This is a big program, and it is hard to imagine crippling it with such covert operations. Those that can readily be killed are not critical, and those who are critical may not be easily accessed. One the cost side of the ledger, Israel doesn’t need to advance an image of itself as an underhanded rogue state reticent to engage in diplomacy and swift to resort to prison-yard tactics.

On the other hand, the measure of success seems to be in delaying progress, and, given this vague metric, Israel might find it worthwhile. However, if they are stalling for President Obama to be out of the White House, they will probably need to keep the ball in play for eight years. Unless, the economy hasn’t bounced back into positive growth within the next three years or there is a major terrorism event that pushes the American people in a more hawkish direction, President Obama is likely to be around in 2016. Of course, they may be banking on the President’s mind being changed or on developing a means to a more permanent solution that doesn’t require US support and/or sanctioning. Certainly if Ahmedinejad remains around, it may only be time before the President, himself, finds that he can’t suffer the idiot or his country’s nuclear ambitions a moment more.

The Los Angeles Times is running a story that suggests that the official stance of the US on Iran’s intentions with respect to nuclear weapons has changed under the Obama Administration. see: http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/washingtondc/la-fg-usiran12-2009feb12,0,3478184.story

Readers may remember the shocking National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) that was released toward the end of 2007 that proposed that there was good reason to believe that the Iranians had shelved their nuclear weapons program. To clarify, as the NIE does, this does not mean that they stopped work on uranium enrichment which is necessary for them to make a nuclear weapons but is also used to make fuel for light-water reactors, nor did it mean that they stopped work on delivery systems (i.e. missiles).

What did it mean? It meant that the intelligence community had some reason to believe that the Iranians had been, but were no longer, conducting research on the systems involved directly in producing a nuclear explosion. Such research might include development of specialized high explosives, metal machining, or the development of precision electronics. One would expect that they had inside sources to make such a bold determination. After all, these types of research are not like testing the nuclear device itself or missile testing that can be easily monitored by technical means such as seismic sensors or satellites. It is also unlike uranium enrichment which requires large electricity-intensive facilities.

The 2007 NIE left many scratching their heads. Even if one had such human intelligence or verifiable signal intelligence in place to give a high degree of confidence of the veracity of your statements, why would you publicize it? On one hand, this might seem to put at risk whatever sources or methods had been used to cultivate the intelligence, and, on the other, it put those negotiating with Iran into a weaker position. Ostensibly, someone had some sort of strategic thought process going on when they released the NEI. Perhaps it was sound and perhaps it was not, one cannot know without better understanding of the intentions of those involved. However, it was certainly controversial, and most significantly with the European nations negotiating with the Iranians.

The LA Time article states that there has been no indication of changing intelligence since the 2007 NIE, but that the current administration believes the Estimate gave a false impression.

What I find interesting is that Presidential Administrations have to take a firm stand about what they believe the opposition’s intentions to be, regardless of whether they can really know what those intentions are with any degree of certainty. While it strains credulity, it is possible that the Iranians are doing as they say. That is, that they are seeking to enrich uranium to use in the nuclear power plant that they have under construction with no intention of building a bomb. The Iranian government’s  behavior with respect to seeking to make fuel that will not be cost competitive with the fuel on the  global market, and in withholding information from the IAEA, makes their veracity seem a dim prospect indeed, but it is not impossible by any means. Of course, it is possible that intelligence agencies have a look “inside the mind” of the Iranians via human intelligence, but it may well be that their is no such insider’s view. In such case, the certitude of any politicians may be a point of concern.

A Q Khan was released from house arrest on Friday. Hopefully, we won’t see any advertisements like theone in the title above on Craigslist in the upcoming weeks.

Khan is the most irresponsible, and arguably the most nefarious, national hero any nation has elevated to that status in recent years. As a metallurgist and former employee of the European uranium enrichment consortium URENCO, he stole plans and components for URENCO centrifuges while spying for Pakistan.  Upon return to Pakistan, he was a dominant figure in the birth of the Pakistani nuclear bomb.

Had this been the extent of his activities, he would probably remain largely unknown to the world outside Pakistan. Few would begrudge a person for engaging in espionage activities that they believed to increase the security of their country (whether it did so or not is another question entirely.)  However, Khan decided to set up shop and sell uranium enrichment equiptment plans, components, and feedstock to the highest bidder. Said highest bidders include Iran, North Korea, and Libya. Iran now has an enrichment program that is well on its way to transitioning from pilot-scale into industrial scale that it likely could not have built without Khan’s assistance. North Korea’s status as a uranium enricher remains unknown. The DPRK claims that they do not have an active program. However, Assistant Secretary James Kelly stated that he was told by a high level source that the North Koreans were building centrifuges, but the North Korean’s later denied this and attributed itto translation error. In a far too rare nonproliferation success story, Libya renounced its program and verifiably reversed course.

While Khan was not in prison, there is a concern that now that he is not even under house arrest, that he will be able to resume his old ways. It should be noted that there does not seem to be confidence that the outer edges of the Khan proliferation ring were ever fully known. We know that Iran and North Korea have both been tight-lipped in refusing to give information about what they obtained from Khan and by what means. Some have speculated that the network might have even continued operation in Khan’s “absence”.

The Pakistani government claims that they have put a number of provisions into place to ensure that Khan cannot pass anything to foreign agents or resume leadership of the proliferation ring, but, given the man’s immense popularity, it remains to be seen whether they can make good on their word. If there is even one fanatical Islamist responsible for monitoring Khan, the world may face a dire increase in proliferation risk.

There have been a flurry of stories as of late about how Iran is on the verge of manufacuring an atomic bomb. The sensationalist headlines usually give way to an explanation that what is meant is that Iran will probably soon have enough uranium enriched to low levels (around 3-4% Uranium-235) that if it cycled this material (as hex gas) back through its  centrifuges  it could soon make enough bomb-grade highly enriched uranium (HEU) (i.e. higher than say 80% U-235) to make a weapon. 

The most recently posted International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) board of governors report, which was produced back in mid-November 2008, indicates Iranian records showing that 630kg of LEU have been produced. http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2008/gov2008-59.pdf 

That report also indicates that the IAEA is confident in its ability to ensure that declared material is not diverted. The report notes that there have been a series of unannounced inspections of the Natanz enrichment plant and that none of the swabs taken has yeilded a sample higher than reactor-grade low enriched uranium. The report does urge that the Additional Protocols (AP) be put into effect as a means to build confidence that there is no production of undeclared material (perhaps, a Herculean task even with the AP.)  It also suggests that Iran could be more forthright with regard to research and development of a military nature (e.g. “Project Green Salt.”) It should be remembered that, while a crude terror weapon could be thrown together quite readily, there are some serious engineering tasks involved in building a weapon that can ride atop a missile and reliably function.

Estimates of when Iran could get the bomb seem to be based on the product of their known/declared facilities, but there is no good explanation of how they might get from LEU to HEU without creating a compelling incentive to preventively strike their facilities. If they perform any of a number of activities that might be necessary to develop HEU on the sly (turning away inspectors, dropping out of the NPT, removing or destroying monitoring equipment) it would seem likely that there would be a great deal of will to conduct attacks.

It is, of course, possible that Iran has developed [another] covert fuel cycle center.  (It should be noted that they did not declare their current pilot enrichment plant or its predecessor near Tehran until they were caught red-handed.) However, if they are building an undeclared facility, then an estimate based on their declared facility is nearly meaningless.

In short, I am skeptical of Iran’s ability to conduct a strategic break-out without suffering a severe blow. It may be true that it doesn’t take a lot to move up to HEU from LEU in terms of additional effort. (i.e.  I am told it is not a linear progression, but, rather, the first several percentage increases in U-235 are a greater challenge than working through the mid-range [i.e. I suspect wringing the last little bit would also be extremely expensive.]) However, diverting material that is being monitored by the IAEA would seem to be a challenge.

Old Photo of Natanz Enrichment Site

Iran’s President, Mohamed Ahmedinejad, has been arguing that only America is really concerned about the Iranian nuclear program. Occasionally, he may acknowledge that there are a few European countries that he portrays as under America’s thumb that may have an interest as well, but that is the extent of the problem. Of course, in reality there are many other countries that have reason to be concerned about Iran’s nuclear program, not the least of whom are other regional states such as Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, Director General Mohamed ElBaradei’s statements to the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA’s) Board yesterday may indicate a yet broader concern. ElBaradei stated that, while the IAEA has been able to monitor Iran’s special nuclear material production facilities, it can make no definitive claims about an alleged nuclear weapon program whose existance has been suggested by classified intelligence reports.

Should we dismiss Ahmedinejad’s claims that Iran has gotten many expressions of support from the leaders of other countries about Iran’s nuclear program? I suspect that there is a core truth in that statement, and that it has developed as a result of poor nonproliferation policies and statements that have muddied the waters. Iran can point not only to the fact that it is a Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) member that appears to be in compliance with facility safeguard provisions (though perhaps not with  requests for transparency), but also to statements that confuse the issues such as the one delivered by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Chairman in Budapest today. http://www.forbes.com/afxnewslimited/feeds/afx/2008/09/23/afx5459052.html Dr. Klein said that Iran could buy its fuel on the open market and has no reason to pursue nuclear fuel production to meet its energy needs. It is true that they could buy the fuel from abroad (far more cheaply than they can make it, in fact), but by pointing to their decision to go that route as a sign that there is somehow a nefarious intent risks raising the ire of other states in that boat. It equates behavior that is in compliance with Article IV of the NPT with a crime.

I can imagine many states responding that USEC didn’t NEED to build the American Centrifuge Project, American and foreign utilities receiving that fuel could get it elsewhere. Why should some countries be able to participate in the nuclear fuel market, and others be locked out. The more Iran can create the impression that the efforts against it are designed by the existing nuclear fuel oligopoly to maintain their favorable market conditions, the more support it is likely to see from states who signed into the NPT beleiving that they could pursue any nuclear technology as long as it is for its peaceful purposes.

Soure: Dean Calma/IAEA

Revisiting the question of whether an Israeli strike on Iran is imminent, there have been some interesting developments recently. I had mentioned a few weeks back that the United States had nixed a proposed deal to sell refueling aircraft to Israel. Mid-air refueling would likely be necessary for the air strikes against Iran to succeed. The journey to Iran is significantly longer than to Iraq or Syria, which Israel bombed in 1981 and 2007 respectively. However, last week there were reports that the US would sell 1,000 GBU-39 bombs to Israel as part of a larger $330 million arms deal that would eventually include state-of-the-art F-35 fighter aircraft as well. According Global Security (http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/munitions/sdb.htm), the GBU-39 is capable of penetrating about 6 foot of steel re-enforced concrete. This would probably not be the ideal weapon for attacking Iran’s nuclear complex, but, by putting many bombs on each target, they could presumbably achieve a high degree of confidence of destroying the enrichment facility. Other key facilities seem to be more fragile than the Natanz uranium enrichment facility that is under who knows how much concrete and may be partitioned to reduce the likelihood of complete loss. The GBU-39 bombs do offer the advantage of being lighter than the much more massive bunker buster bombs that the US Air Force would be likely to use. (This speaks to the limited range and mid-air refueling capacity mentioned above.)

The more immediate story is the IAEA’s showing of photos of an attempt to modify the Shahab-3 missile to carry a nuclear warhead. This is further indication of Iran’s attempts to get its ducks in a row so that when it obtains enough material for a nuclear device, it would be ready to put that material into use in short order. Earlier there had been stories of Project Green Salt, which was allegedly Iran’s initiative to conduct the research (other than fissile material production) that would be needed to build a nuclear weapon (i.e. ostensibly this involved testing of the specialized conventional explosives and precision electronics required and questions of that nature.) A much bemoaned National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) of November of 2007 indicated that the US had cultivated intelligence that suggested that Iran had paused its weapons development program (note: this is referring to those activities specifically intended to produce a weapon and not to uranium enrichment, for which an expanding capability has been under development throughout the period in question.) At any rate, the photos are an indication that Iran is working in a direction that would present a dire threat to Israel.

Yesterday, the IAEA distributed its latest safeguard report on Iran to the Board. This report will not be made available to the public at least until after the Board meets on September 22nd to discuss it. Given the stalwart refusal of Iran to change its behavior in the face of global demands to do so, one would imagine that the report will document continued progress in building up a centrifuge enrichment capability and a lack of resolution of the outstanding issues that are keeping Iran in hot water with the international community.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors approved a safeguard agreement that will apply to India’s nuclear facilities that are deemed “civilian” in character. This is but one hurdle that had to be overcome on the way to a US-India agreement  on nuclear technology transfer. The next step is to obtain the consent of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), an international organization consisting of 45 nations that sell various forms of nuclear technology. After that, the US Congress must allow some legal leeway before the deal can enter into effect. The basis of the deal is that India would partition its ”military” from its “civilian” nuclear facilities, and all of the civilian facilities would go under IAEA safeguards. In exchange, the Indians would be eligible to receive nuclear technology and fuel. This would put them in a limbo position between nuclear weapon state (NWS) and non-nuclear weapon state (NNWS), but they would remain outside the nuclear nonproliferation treaty regime, so that distinction would remain somewhat irrelevant.  

This is a tremendously controversial agreement for many reasons. First, India is not a member of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), and, as such, is not generally eligible for the type of technical cooperation that members of the NPT who have all of their facilities under safeguards are allowed. This sends an unpalatable message that it is not whether one is a NPT member in good-standing that matters, but rather whether you are friendly with America. Of course, we all understand that any system governed by rule of law (treaty law included) should treat relationships with the judge as irrelevant, and, instead, should be concerned with whether one is in compliance with the law. Nonproliferation proponents have good reason to believe that the US-India deal erodes the foundations of the global nuclear nonproliferation regime. States may reasonably conclude that whether they are members of the NPT and comply with safeguards is not important. What is important is whether the suppliers “like” them. If they don’t “like” them (e.g. Iran) then it doesn’t matter whether they are in the NPT and under safeguards agreements or out. If suppliers do like them (e.g. India) it doesn’t matter if they are not members, have unsafeguarded facilities, or, for that matter, have a history of engaging in provocative actions of nuclear testing. Putting this in the context of domestic rule of law, why not steal and then play golf with the judge, if the latter is what matters and not the former with respect to whether one is convicted or not. Besides resistance from nonproliferation advocates everywhere, states such as Pakistan are loudly outspoken about the unreasonableness of the agreement.

Second, in India the deal is controversial for entirely different reasons. It is controversial to many because it gives away a lot of the current options available, and purists don’t feel India should have to give these things up. India’s views have been steadfastly defined by the stance that it cannot accept or be party to such a discriminatory regime as the NPT. This is a hard point to argue. Why, in deed, should any country agree to accept some arbitrary year as the deadline past which no new states are allowed to acquire nuclear weapons? Either nuclear weapons have utility or they don’t, and, if they do, why should some states voluntarily deny themselves while others have full rights to them?

What motivates the deal? It is clear that there are benefits to be had from such a deal. The most important has to do with the value of gearing up emerging nations for life in the twenty-first century. It is clear that if massive and rapidly-developing states such as India and China repeat the growth behavior of the current industrialized nations, it will have a grave impact globally. If India uses the same mix of energy as it attempts to meet its needs as did a rising US, the effect on international market prices will be an astronomical monotonic rise. Furthermore, if India and China continue to emit carbon as the current batch of industrialized countries have , then global climate disruption may become exacerbated severely.

There is little reason to doubt both that the US-India deal is a bad deal for the global nuclear nonproliferation regime, but, at the same time, the world would benefit from India’s greater reliance on energy sources that are not fossil fuels and are low carbon emitting. This may be further reason to give heed to the need to move toward global disarmament as the only way to reconcile the many presently irreconcilable objectives, and to avoid the blatantly discriminatory arguments that must be put forth to advocate nonproliferation under the status quo.