I attended the Honeywell-Nobel Laureate Lecture at Georgia Tech a week ago on November 4th 2009. The speaker was Sir Harry Kroto, and he gave a rapidly paced and entertaining talk entitled Science, Society, and Sustainability. The middle portion of this talk, the part dealing with society, dealt to a large degree with the tension between science and religion, and, in particular, his views about intolerance and dogmatism among many religious people.  

During this section, he raised an interesting question. To paraphrase [hopefully largely in accordance with his intended meaning], the question was: ‘How many people think that parents should be able to raise their children to believe whatever they choose?’  To which I was one of several who feebly raised hands. There was then a follow-up about whether the view was maintained in the face of the fact that people were teaching their children that those who believe in evolution [he might have put it in terms of being atheist and /or agnostics] would end up in hell. While I’m not certain of his exact phrasing, the jist was that “non-believers” [however people who deem themselves qualified to make such determinations define it] would end up being punished in some form of eternal afterlife.

Now, if the question is whether it is an unconscionable thing to teach a child, I would have to say yes. Furthermore, if the question is whether people should decry such lessons in intolerance, I would agree with this as well. I would even go as far as to say that one should use any influence one has as respectable forthright citizen to set a good example about how one should properly address differences in worldview. However, the “should be allowed to” indicated the potential for a more ominous meaning in the form of the state using its monopoly on legitimate force to somehow try to regulate and /or over-ride parents. I don’t mean to imply that is what Professor Kroto meant, as he did not get into any detail and I had to leave during the Q&A. However, if the question is should people be allowed to teach there children bad ideas, I would have to answer yes – because there is no alternative that doesn’t result in a greater bad.

However, given that children learn lessons from parents not only from explicit teaching statements but through observation of all manner of daily conduct, to try to control these lessons would be akin to trying to control thought-which is a slippery and treacherous course. If the question is whether the state should use its monopoly on legitimate force to try to control what moral, ethical, and normative lessons parents teach their children, then I think that would be a sad idea. I, of course, am not just speaking  of the state using force directly, but through those mechanisms that are enforceable by force such as regulations or dictated curriculums for private and home-schooled children. 

Should one try to undermine a parent? First, I would suggest one consider whether undermining a parent’s legitimacy in some areas is not undermining their legitimacy in all areas? If so, what is the result of society in which children are put in the middle of a tug of war between what parents say and the state’s suggestion that a parent cannot be trusted to be correct. In some sense, we should all try to undercut bad thinking, but the idea that there would be a formal mechanism of the state to try to undermine what parents teach is a little disturbing to me.  First, it is not likely to be effective because parents have the benefit of primacy in a children’s learning experience. Mao tried to override parental education during his Cultural Revolution, and it failed. Second, and more importantly, regulating thought is not a route to a more peaceful society, but to perennial war.  

While we should strive to be as virtuous as possible in thought as well as deed and to set good examples, it does not follow that one can control the thought of others. If a person cannot be free in their own mind, in what manner can he or she be said to be free? Where people act and move about, they have the potential to hinder the free action of others, but, in their minds, they may think as they please, and through thought alone, cannot adversely impact  the lives of others. This is the crux of the issue. While there is an important role for the government in negating the use of force or fraud between citizens, there is greater damage to be done in trying to regulate and control thought than there is in the many sad and despicable ideas that exist in the world.

If one wants a peaceful world, regulating thought is the kind of activity that one should like to avoid. The path to peace is, first and foremost, followed by setting laudable examples. This means that we all have to avoid the tyranny of certainty – that is, thinking and acting on certainty in one’s own life with regards to those things about which one cannot possibly be certain. This certainly applies to homo religiosis (religious man) who preaches that those who don’t believe as he does will be damned for an eternal afterlife, but it also applies to scientists who call people with religious beliefs deluded. The former thinks he or she knows the mind of his god – typically in contravention of his or her own belief structure that indicates god is more vast than man can understand, and the latter has achieved certainty based on his or her interpretation of an inductive process in contravention of the logic of science.

Why do I think that “soft power” is the only way to challenge bad ideas? By this I mean to say that the state (or others using force illegitimately) cannot force anyone to believe anything, but, at best, individuals can spread good ideas through exemplary thought and deed and at the expense of bad ideas. I think of the root of conflict in terms of an intangible construct that I’ll call “societal burden”. This burden exists wherever control is exerted over the autonomous thought, movement, and action of individuals. Where such burden exists and there is no other means to relieve it, people will engage in conflict. This burden is the root of conflict, and, as such, the object should be to minimize this burden. I am not advocating anarchy, of course. Optimization by way of minimization of societal burden is not achieved by a lack of government. With no government, the strong and amoral may exercise control over the weak,and this may lead to a proliferation of societal burden. Government, while it takes the role of exerting some control, also, by maintaining a monopoly on legitimate force, is able to keep the strong and immoral from preying on all others. Over the centuries an important feedback mechanism has developed by way of democratic and republican systems that allows the governed to exert force back over the government- and this feedback keeps government from going hog-wild in exercising force  over the citizenry as is seen in dictatorships and authoritarian systems. A second key tool is a blind rule of law that applies universally, but is not subject to arbitrary modification except with the consent of the governed.

It seems we have evolved a pretty good system for minimizing societal burden as well as for gradually pushing bad ideas out of the marketplace of ideas through soft power, and, hopefully, our systems will continue to move in the right direction. However, there are no short-cuts and one cannot speed up the pace.

RoK Navy Ships Like Those Involved in Skirmish

The navies of North and South Korea engaged in a brief, 2-3 minute, skirmish that resulted in the North Korean ship returning to port for repair. The engagement occurred after a North Korean ship apparently ventured across a limit line off the west coast of the peninsula and then failed to heed an extended volley of warning shots. There were no South Korean casualties.

There seems to be a widespread belief that the North Koreans engaged in the provocation to send a signal in advance of President Obama’s impending  trip to Asia. Incidentally, the US recently announced that it would send a special envoy, Stephen Bosworth, to North Korea to engage in talks on North Korea’s nuclear weapons program.  Of course, this rationale may or may not be accurate. For all we know, the North Korean captain and crew were attempting to carry out a “Hunt-for-Red-October-esque” defection plot. However, the hypothesis about sending a message does seem consistent with North Korean behavior historically, which tends toward the provocative and crisis bargaining.

Assuming that the North Korean action is an attempt to either send a message or influence behavior, what is the goal and how does Kim Jong Il imagine this behavior will translate into his objective? From this side of the street one might assume that the provocative action is designed to push the Obama Administration away from the negotiating table. One does not have to have a great understanding of American politics to understand that the more North Korea engages in provocation, the more it makes it impossible for President Obama to extend an olive branch. While the President may enjoy creating a more peaceful tone for global diplomacy and a large swath of the American citizenry may support him in this, he is also well aware that politically he cannot afford to respond to aggression with conversation or concession. More broadly than just the President, the Democratic Party realizes that one of its greatest Achilles’ Heels is an appearance of weakness that the American public finds unappealing in times of crisis. Of course, this assumes that Kim Jong Il has internalized the old lesson from Sun Tzu, and that he knows his enemy as well as himself. The evidence doesn’t seem to support this in that what Kim Jong Il says he wants often seems to be paired with actions that are designed to do anything but achieve his stated goals.

A second possibility is that Kim wants to negotiate but wants to avoid starting from a position in which his country is seen as the weak party in the negotiation. I suspect this is what most people refer to when they say that Kim Jong Il ordered his Navy to be provocative because of Obama’s visit. This raises the question of how provoking a naval force whose capabilities seem to be several generations ahead of yours achieves this goal. The somewhat predictable outcome of the North Korean ship returning to port in flames while the South Korean ships remain untouched does not seem to bode well for an expression of strength. However, there is an alternative to showing strength by might, and that is showing strength by way of the will to be kooky. That is, Kim Jong Il may be saying: “Look I know my country is poor and seems too weak to have leverage, but I am willing to press things to the limit so don’t discount me.”

There is another possibility, and that derives from the inability to segregate domestic from foreign messages. That is, Kim Jong Il may be trying to convince his people that the dynasty is still alive and well without having any intended message for actors abroad. I have not heard much about Kim Jong Il’s successor in all this, but internally there may be an attempt to build some gravitas for him.

I don’t know what resides in the mind of Kim Jong Il or Kim Jong Un, but it seems clear they need better advice on strategy.

In the Fall of 2002  I drafted an essay that became a Cato Institute Policy Analysis paper on why invading Iraq was a bad idea. In essence, the paper used rational actor theory to propose that there were better ways to address the threat to US security interests posed by Iraq, to the extent such threats existed, than by going to war. Now, seven years later, it is interesting to revisit the subject.

What made me think about this the recent discussion about a surge for Afghanistan. General McChrystal’s suggestion that 40,000 additional troops need to be introduced into the theatre raised quite a stir in the news. However, there seems to be a widespread opinion among military leaders that the 40,000 could not begin to be introduced until the new year, and could not fully be in place until late next year (presuming that they would all come from the US.) Perhaps President Obama’s delayed response is due to an attempt to figure out where they could get these troops in a reasonable timeframe. It is telling that despite a budget of over half a trillion dollars (not counting supplementals) and a military of over three million people when all branches and reserves are included, we cannot come up with 40,000 troops. Of course, few of the three million are relevant to the task at hand (i.e. sending F-16 mechanics or submariner firemen to Afghanistan is not that useful), but this raises a question for another day about why our military seems to be so ill-tailored to the wars it fights. However, the point to note here is that we can’t come up with 40,000 troops because many of the relevant troops are either in Iraq, already in Afghanistan, or are momentarily  rotated out of one of our two war zones long enough to keep their private lives in order and their sanity intact.

Let me acknowledge first that I, at least, was as fooled as anyone about the likelihood that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and /or programs for WMD. Readers of past posts will note that I place little stock in the ability to know or predict behavior absent first-hand knowledge. Despite the sound advice of Sun Tzu that we cannot know an enemy’s capabilities (much less their intentions) without first-hand information (e.g. through spies) and that such knowledge cannot be derived from oracles, humanity still thinks it can – except our oracles are probabilistic risk models. That said, in the absence of certain knowledge one is forced to make a best guess based on a reasonable reading of past actions and the available  indicators. I maintain that, given the uncertainty, it was not unreasonable to think that Iraq had WMD, and, at any rate, the advice given was optimal whether Iraq had WMD or not. The fact that Hussein did not have WMD by no means invalidates but rather bolsters the core message of the paper that (even believing that there were chemical weapons or worse) the threat to US security interests was overblown, and, to the extent these threats existed, they could be handled more effectively without force.

The question at hand here is whether we are better off having attacked Iraq, and I would maintain that we are certainly not at the moment. If, unlikely as it may be, we are threatened tomorrow by an actual threat to our existence or fundamental strategic interests we would be slow and hard-pressed to respond because we are stretched thin by the war in Iraq. True, there is one less dictator in the world. Nice as that may sound, as long as that dictator is not ruling the US, it is not a good measure of whether US interests are improved.

One issue to consider is the threat posed by the perception of the US as a “high capability – low will” state. I don’t suspect we have any enemies that think the capability of the US military is anything but extremely high. Our military is technologically without peer, and is, at best, matched by few in terms of the level of training and morale of forces (I would contend that an all-voluntary military is a force-multiplier unto itself, particularly after spending so much time studying the Russian system and its influence on combat-effectiveness when I was a graduate student .) However, there is also a perception that the US has a limited stomach for warfare, and will not see its engagements through to the end. This problem is created when a country is a little too fast-and-loose in going to war. Its danger is that it decreases the perception of other states of the cost of conflict with America and makes them more likely to engage in activities that may be viewed as threatening.

Frankly, I am astounded at the relatively slow erosion of support for conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan that is, I presume, a mix of the influence of the 9-11 events on the national psyche and a detachment of the average American to these distant wars. The erosion is present none-the-less. It is not unreasonable that American support for the war in Iraq has diminished. The outcome of the conflict fundamentally affects the way people in Iraq live but not substantially how Americans live, and so it is a given that people over there will be willing to fight long after our will wanes. You may remember hearing a line during the political debates to the effect that ”Timelines to withdraw would be a boon to insurgents and radical elements”. I hate to break it to those critics, but whether we leave now, next year, or in 20 years, some radical element will be around to claim victory. 

The US needs to look at war more like it looks at nuclear war. In other words, it is an extreme action against dire attacks against the national existence or critical national interests and should not be engaged in lightly, and that, having made the decision, we will fully accept the consequences of war and see the conflict through to a definitive end. War as a means to reach limited objectives such as tweaking the world into a more palatable form – as I would suggest was the case in Iraq – is a dangerous game. 

Unfortunately, we are really only mid-course in the conflict in Iraq, so knowing the degree to which we will be better or worse off after than before the war remains unclear. If our government (both the Bush and Obama administrations) is correct in its prevailing presumption that we can leave an Iraq that is democratic, stable, and friendly to the US we may end up better off. However, we live in a world where uncertainty is inexorable, and there are other scenarios, that we cannot accurately judge the likelihood of, that may make us worse off. The most prominent of these alternative scenarios is that the Shia majority takes control and reciprocates against a minority that oppressed them for decades. Under this scenario, we will have essentially built an Iraq – Iran alliance that will make any involvement we have in the Persian Gulf region more challenging and may shake up regional stability.

India’s first indigenously-built nuclear reactor-propelled submarine today begins a two year shake-down that, if successful, will result in its addition to the fleet of the Indian Navy. It is interesting to consider the potential strategic ramifications of the sub. It should be noted that this is not India’s first submarine (it has purchased from other countries in the past – notably Russia, who was credited in assisting in this project as well) and that, as mentioned, it’s launch ceremony is not synonymous with it entering service because it is still untried.

In general, nuclear submarines have a mixed influence on strategic stability. A  sub’s ability to hide beneath the seas and to operate there exceptionally quietly for extended periods, means that it is a weapons platform whose survivability is high. This is consistent with deterrence theory. A state needs survivable weapons so that the enemy knows that massive retaliation to an attack is imminent, and that there is no use in trying to swamp an enemy’s deterrent capability.

On the other hand, submarines make the opponent exceedingly concerned about the sub owner’s intentions. Because a sub can pop up off-shore and launch along varying azimuths relatively close and without warning, there is a fear that they will be used to eliminate the enemy’s retaliatory capability as part of a plan to negate the opposition’s deterrent. Both China and Pakistan have small arsenals, and are, therefore, theoretically vulnerable to having their deterrent destroyed by a first strike. In reality China’s deterrent is apparently heavily fortified by being built into a mountain and is not so tiny as to make an opponent confident about knocking it out.

It should be noted that Prime Minister Singh emphasized during the launch speach that India did not have agressive intentions with the new weapon system . Of course, talk is cheap, and whether Pakistan and China believe the rhetoric will be determined by more than word choice. It will be interesting to see what effect, if any, the new system has on regional stability.

The magnitude of the United States’ Department of Defense (DoD) is, on many levels, awe-inspiring. This led me to create this little trivia game called “DoD or Country” that considers which is larger in various aspects - our defense complex or given countries. I hope you enjoy it. The anwers appear below. Don’t peak.

 Questions:  

1.) Weighing in at $583 billion US dollars, which is more expensive: the US DoD budget or the budget of the entire government of Australia?

2.) At 9,500 square kilometers, which is more extensive: America’s largest military installation -White Sands Missile Range – or the country of Cyprus?

3.) Consisting of about 3,600,000 people, which is larger: the combined active, reserve, and civilian components of the DoD or the population of Mongolia?

4.) At 440,000 barrels per day, who consumed more oil in 2006: the Department of Defense or the country of Argentina?

5.) Consisting of 45 ships, which is larger: the US Naval Fleet Auxillary Force (i.e. the ships that supply the Navy’s combat fleet) or the merchant marine fleet of Lithuania? 

6.) Consisting of 185 aircraft, which contains more aircraft:  the current C-17 cargo plane fleet of the US Air Force or the current Singapore Airline’s fleet (all models of aircraft combined)?

7.) At 764 dead, which involved a greater number of lost lives: the US military’s Killed in Action figure for 2007 or the number of fatalities due to terrorism (as defined by the US NCTC) in Somalia in the same year.

8.)At 2,150 Megawatts (electrical) [MW(e)], which has a higher combined output rating from all nuclear reactors: all of the active  aircraft carriers of the US Navy or all the commercial nuclear power plants in Brazil?

Answers:

1.) DoD; Australia’s annual budget in the same year (2008) was a mere $340 billion.

2.) Cyprus; White Sands is 8,300 square kilometers (1,2oo km. sq. less.)

3.) DoD; Mongolia’s population is only about 3.041 million.

4.) Argentina; The South American nation’s oil consumption was 120,000 barrels per day more.

5.) Lithuania; The Baltic state’s fleet consists of about five more merchant ships than the US Navy’s Auxillary force. (Perhaps a few more than that depending upon how you define “ship.”)

6.) DoD; The Air Force has almost 80 more C-17s (of all varients) than the Singapore Airline has in total aircraft (of all models.)

7.) DoD; The DoD reported 25 more killed in action in 2007 than was the number of Somali terrorism fatalities (739) that year.

8.) DoD; Brazil’s two reactors are rated at 2,007 MW(e), while the 10 Nimitz and one Enterprise class carriers have ratings of 194 MW(e) (both reactors on a Nimitz combined [times 10]) and 210 MW(e) (all eight Enterprise reactors combined).

Is Iran on the verge of a revolution? Can Kim Jong Un maintain power if his father transfers it to him in the near future? Are we seeing the leading indicators of America’s decline in conditions like debt that is completely out of control, failing business giants, the crippling costs of persistent asymmetric warfare, and looming unaddressed crises such as the mathematically infeasible pay-go social security system? What will the rise of massive high-growth emerging economies mean for world affairs? What will the world look like politically, economically, and diplomatically 3 months from now?; 6 months?; 1 year?; 2 years?  

We are living in interesting times. We could be on the precipice of some very major changes to the international system. Sometimes change is slow and evolutionary; sometimes it is faster and more revolutionary; and, rarely but occasionally, the conditions evolve to converge to the point where it is catastrophically instantaneous. There is a vigorous tug of war in progress between inertia and the winds of change.

I would love to be able to make some definitive predictions about what the world will look like next year. Like the vast majority of people, I am motivated by discomfort with uncertainty to want to think that I can have a grasp on how events will unfold. However, the lesson (an unintended lesson to be sure) that has most stuck with me in completing graduate degrees in International Relations and Economics  is that anyone who thinks they can predict the future unfolding of large-scale political and economic events is full of crap. This will no doubt be considered heresy to many who have made lucrative livings because we (as a species) would rather pay millions to someone who makes an incorrect prediction than to accept that we have no idea what will transpire. One can read papers that misapply probabilistic and statistical models in some of the most elite scholarly journals because even the most educated of our society are addicted to thinking that the future can be known in a system whose level of complexity remains beyond our capacity to unravel.

My advice to those trying to get a handle on the future, save your soothsayer money, hedge your bets, and enjoy the ride.

On April 5th, President Obama gave a masterful speech in Prague, the later half of which was devoted to the topic of nuclear disarmament. The speech began with an homage to people who acted on a belief that change could be achieved against an overwhelming sentiment that it could not (referring, of course, to the Cold War), and then implied that people of the same ilk were needed to advance disarmament in a similar manner.

Those wishing to see any momentum that may have been created by this speech derailed could hardly ask for better intervening world events. North Korea conducted its second test of a nuclear device, and, in the process, displayed an improved capability had been achieved. Following the nuclear test, they proceeded to set off short-range missiles like  some sort of Independence Day display, and it appears that they are preparing for a long-range missile test in up-coming weeks. Meanwhile, the Iran front remains unchanged. In other words, the Iranians are getting progressively closer to having an infrastructure that would support making weapons-grade fissile material in sufficient quantities within a reasonable time period, and this is making many countries (re: Israel) really unnerved.

It might be argued that such events are a potential boon to disarmament because they underscore the nature of the threat and give impetus for positive action. After all, nonproliferation is unlikely to go anywhere without the major nuclear weapon states showing progress toward disarmament. If the 2010 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) review conference turns out to be a carryover from 2005, then we can expect backward and not forward momentum on nonproliferation. 

Unfortunately, I suspect that current events do not bode well for advancing the agenda President Obama laid out in his Prague Speech. Nuclear weapon states will only ease their grasp if they feel relatively safe from the threat of attack by states. I emphasize “by states” because I don’t think world leaders give much sway to deterrence as a strategy against nuclear terrorism, but they are pretty confident about the value of deterrence against states. While the threat of nuclear terrorism may (or may not) be on the rise, I don’t think that is a non-starter for disarmament. However, the same cannot be said of risk from states.

As the President stated, nuclear disarmament is not likely to be achieve quickly. There were a number of steps that were laid out that are considered intermediary steps including: reduction of the relevance of nuclear weapons to overall security, bilateral reductions between US and Russia, enactment the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), verifiable implementation of the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT), strengthening of inspection authority, development of a fuel bank, and progress with North Korea and Iran.

The question is whether all of these are necessary, and, if so, whether any of them are intractable. Take, for example, the question of verifiability of the FMCT. The Bush Administration dropped this treaty supposedly because it was “impossible” to verify. The present administration seems to take as a forgone conclusion that it can be verified. This tells us one of two things. The best case scenario is that the two camps are working under different assumptions about what constitutes a minimally acceptable level of verification. I say this is the “best case” because there would ostensibly be underlying facts that could be agreed upon, and, therefore, there would be a map to understand what would be necessary to move towards a negotiated agreement (e.g. what technological developments.) The worst case is that politics is leading the facts and science- in which case there may be no room for agreement. By “politics leading” I mean that either the Bush Administration started from from the position that they did not want to support the FMCT and found arguing the unprovable case of non-verifiability a good means to quash it, or the Obama Administration started from the position that they wanted the FMCT and knew it required arguing that it was, in fact, verifiable, or, given the possibility that no one knows the answer yet, both of the above. If this is the case, then there is no incentive for either side to reduce ambiguity, and little prospect for moving forward.

When there is a point of intractability, one needs to determine whether there is a new approach to the subject that can be taken, and what it might be. Too often there is a failure to recognize points of intractability, and then to be creative about how to change the underlying conditions to one where progress is possible.

We are now on missile test number seven, following the test of a nuclear device by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). The Obama Administration’s stance seems to be: “just let baby Kim Jong Il do his thing, he’ll cry himself to sleep.” Secretary Gates has indicated that he has seen no reason to suggest a build up of forces on the peninsula, and the US is not taking any action that might be seen as escalatory.

I am not being critical of this strategy as it seems about the only reasonable course to take without having any better understanding of the motivations and thinking that inform Kim Jong Il’s behavior. It would be nice to have a good historical analogy as a guide to what strategy might best be employed. However, the most apropos analogy seems to be a thug that wants something and has decided to act out until others relent. If Kim Jong Il were trying to provoke the US into war, he could easily enough do that by artillery attacks on the South. This would guarantee a fight. However, it is difficult to imagine what Kim might think he could gain from getting into a war with an opposition that holds advantages in every area except perhaps raw number of servicemen. While I have no doubt that, like many dictators, he may be a little deluded as a result of his own narcissism and being surrounded by people too fearful to tell him how the world really is, I doubt that he finds the risk of war acceptable. Furthermore, I have trouble with the idea that Kim Jong Il is trying to get the rest of the world to give him some space while he gets his “house” in order with respect to transition, because his actions are designed to do anything but get others off his back. However, I can believe that there is a domestic driver to his behavior. It is certainly possible that he is trying to show no weakness to those within the DPRK as he tries to set up Kim Jong Un for successorship. He might be worried that certain elements smell blood in the water.

The options seem to be: contain and ignore, attack and destroy, or relent and be played. Attacking North Korea would be exceedingly costly given their ability to reign down artillery on heavily populated areas of South Korea. I’ve heard this capacity is pretty well hardened against possible preemption. Relenting just takes us down a dangerous path that we have been before, and it encourages bad behavior in others. This leaves the option of letting Kim do as he pleases as long as his activities don’t become a direct threat, and not giving him the attention and concessions he seeks, as probably the best course at the moment.  

It should be noted that there is also the argument that the tests are a signal to potential arms buyers. I would not be surprised if this were true. I am presuming /hoping that during the period when the IAEA and US were verifying dismantlement that there were  samples taken at the reprocessing facility such that attribution could be definitively made if a nuclear device using North Korean material were to go off anywhere in the world. It must be made clear to the DPRK that if a nuclear explosion occurs using their material anywhere in the world and by any perpetrator, they suffer massive retaliation.

Source: CIA Factbook

North Korea followed up on its underground test of a nuclear explosive device with two missile tests while the intervening hours were filled with statements of outrage by world leaders. The South Koreans have since responded by announcing their intent to formally join onto the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). The PSI is designed to hinder trafficking of materials and technologies used in Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) production by way of inspections of suspect ships, containers, and vehicles transiting through the participant’s territory or territorial waters. The North Koreans are on-record publicly opposing South Korea’s participation even on an ad hoc basis as it has in the past. The South Korean response will no doubt spur further attempts to up the ante from Kim Jong Il. 

Of course, by going to a high level of provocation with the tests, there is little Kim Jong Il (or whoever controls the country in the future, e.g. Kim Jong Un) can do without a severe risk of overplaying his hand. No doubt the appeal of the tests for Kim is that they are concrete actions, and, therefore, have more effect than mere rhetoric – which no one need take particularly seriously because of its low cost. However, what action do you follow up nuclear and missile tests with, if you are not eager to get into a war that will likely pit the rest of the world against you?

On the other hand, the international community also has limited acceptable options. Certainly, there exists, given the lack of economic self-sufficiency of the DPRK, an ability to make life hard on the North Korean people, but nobody is eager to further starve people who are already suffering and who do not have means to control the provocative decisions of their leaders. One has to feel bad for the North Korean people who have experienced famine in a region otherwise characterized by rapid growth and development (i.e. famine solely due to bad governance), and who will no doubt suffer more before this escalatory spiral has played out. That being said, to give in to such escalatory provocations will put us back on a path we have all too many times trod before.  

Had Saddam Hussein not been executed, I would suggest Kim Jong Il give him a call and get some tips for opulent living in a spider hole.

North Korea conducted a second nuclear weapons test today [Pyongyang time]. Reports on estimation of yield have not appeared in the journalistic accounts that I have seen as of the moment. Reports of the Richter Scale measurements of the event indicate that it was a few tenths higher on that non-linear scale of seismic activity than was the fall 2006 test.

The first test was believed a fizzle because its low yield indicated a limited ability to sustain a chain reaction. It will be interesting to see how this test compares to the last, and whether it indicates that they have made significant or little progress with the effectiveness of their device. It seems likely that the decision to test and, within a range, the timing of the test are politically rather than technically driven. That is to say, the test probably did not come about because the engineers and scientists wanted test improvements to their design, and, therefore, it is possible that there have been no technological breakthroughs since the last test. If they are still struggling with their design, it is difficult to see what the test gets Kim Jong Il in net from a strategic standpoint. It gets the world’s attention (as it has done), but it also eliminates ambiguity about how advanced the DPRK’s program is. (This, arguably, creates a first mover incentive for countries to attack while the North Korean deterrent is not yet effective.) It is not clear that Kim Jong Il is that deep of a thinker, or whether foreign governments are at the forefront of his mind at the moment.

While the DPRK also quite recently tested a long-range missile, it is not clear that they are on the cusp of a launchable weapon. The nuclear explosion has to not only work, but be delivered in a sufficiently small package.

It should be noted that at least one of the political reasons for the test is apparently an adverse counter-reaction to the world’s reaction to the aforementioned missile test. That is, Kim Jong Il is in the midst of a temper tantrum over the rebuke delivered by way of the United Nations. Another possible reason includes the need to prove potency to the North Korean people during a period in which Kim Jong Il is looking like he is not long for this world, and the leading contender for his successor, youngest son Kim Jong-Un, is inexperienced and has not yet effectively asserted his claim to rule. This leads me to the question of the day which is whether the primary driver for the test is international, domestic, or some inexorable combination of both of the above.